By Adnan Khan
Bashar al-Assad vowed to “live
or die’ in Syria, I am Syrian, I was made in Syria, I have to live in
Syria and die in Syria. I do not think the West is going [to intervene],
but if they do so, nobody can tell what is next. I think the price of
this invasion if it happened is going to be more than the whole world
can afford." Speaking with Russia Today TV earlier this month,
the Syrian president made clear he had no intention of fleeing. Whilst
the syrian military has numerous shortcommings,
Assad’s armed forces possess more capability than the opposition forces
and this has allowed Assad to pursue a four pronged strategy of
crushing the uprising.
Air raids and long range artillery bombardment has been a consistent feature of al-Assad’s strategy to subdue the masses.
Daraa in March 2011 was the first town to have faced al-Assad’s
strategy of crushing the people with overwhelming force. Snipers took up
positions on rooftops, water supplies were cut, as well as telephone
lines, the town was completely cut off from the rest of the country as
artillery rained upon the town. The use of Soviet era aircraft is part
of Assad’s psychological war. Residents have confirmed “pilots employ
psychological tactics. Jets frequently swoop down in mock strafing
raids, break the sound barrier over urban centers, or fly menacingly at
high altitudes, a sign of a possible bombing raid. Low flying helicopter
gunships also spray streets with machine-gun fire, and residents lose
sleep over air activity at night that frays the nerves of civilians and
rebels alike.” This strategy softens the rebels' defenses ahead of the next phase which is conducting a wide scale siege.
The siege
of Homs which began in May 2011 and lasted for over 8 months saw the
indiscriminate slaughter of anyone who stood in the face of Assad’s army
units. The Syrian Army began by launching an offensive against the
district of Baba Amr, even though Baba Amr had no heavy weapons. A large
scale siege was conducted, the entire Baba Amr district was shelled,
after all supply routes were blocked. Following this, tanks rolled into
several districts of Homs and started a manhunt for all known opposition
supporters. The night before the start of the operation, the military
cut electricity to the city. In October 2012, Homs experienced its third
army offensive and probably its worst bombardment in months when
warplanes, tanks and artillery fired missiles and mortars at rebel
controlled neighborhoods. Throughout these attacks the opposition has
remained entrenched in their defensive positions.
The use of mercenaries in the crackdown has also been another feature of al-Assad’s strategy for survival.
The Shabiha have been carrying out a campaign of intimidation by
killing and beating people who attend demonstrations, they have also
been carrying out executions, drive-by shootings and sectarian attacks.
As the Syrian army is composed mainly of sunni’s, Assad has been forced
to rely on just a handful of trusted units - the 4th Armoured Division,
the Republican Guard and 14th Special Forces. As a result, militia
groups have been used consistently embedded with the army to lay siege
on towns. One Shabiha member highlighted his role: “The government
gave me 30,000 Syrian pounds per month and an extra 10,000 per person
that I captured or killed. I raped one girl, and my commander raped many
times. It was normal."
Bashar
al-Assad’s forces are now faced by a countrywide uprising, with
opposition pockets forming in most the countries’ key governorates. As
the regime is only using a fraction of its forces and given its finite
resources, the regime has prioritized its operations. The military
continues to go on offensives aimed at destroying opposition pockets in
critical areas. This has led to large swaths of the countryside
effectively being ceded to the people as the regime’s forces focus on
amassing enough firepower to maintain control over critical cities
and supply lines. Each time the regime besieges a town, it is to the
detriment of regime positions in other areas. As a result, the regime
has come to disengage from direct confrontation in most areas it is
facing an uprising. Whilst fighting continues in many areas of the
country, Aleppo and Damascus are dominating the regime’s resources in
terms of direct confrontation. The regime cannot sustain supply lines or losses in direct engagement in most of the country and more.
It is nearly
two years since the people of Syria rose up against the regime of
Bashar al-Assad. The regime initially used its notorious secret service
to quell the uprising, but the regime then turned to its military as the
uprising spread to the whole country. The military has employed all of
its military might against both civilian and opposition forces in the
hope of halting the uprising. In the face of defections and divisions amongst segments of Alawites, Bashar al-Assad’s grip on power is loosening.
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