On May 25th,
Hezbollah's chief, Hassan Nasrallah, declared that his Lebanese based
Shia militia will fight with all its capacity to save the Syrian
regime. After several maneuvers in the last few months, walking the
tightrope of public diplomacy, he finally admitted his direct
involvement in supporting Bashar al-Assad's brutal crackdown on the
Syrian Revolution. In pushing out the Israeli occupation from Lebanon in
2000 and it's tactical victory over Israel in 2006, Hezbollah
skyrocketed in fame amongst all Arabs, including even Sunnis. Siding
with the oppressive regime in Damascus, however, has destroyed any
goodwill Hezbollah had within the Sunni majority of the Middle East.
Nasrallah, Arabic for "God's victory", became famously Narsallat, or
"idol's victory" and his party of God became known as the party of Satan
within the media and the masses.
Both Hezbollah and Hamas were sponsored by the Assad regime; but unlike
Hamas, which has smartly pulled out of Syria and sided with the
revolting Arab populations to sustain its popular base, Hezbollah stuck
to the regime. From a strategic perspective, Hamas did not have a
choice since it is a Sunni based group that relies on its popular base
for survival on the Palestinian theater. Sticking to a regime who has
been murdering people en mass, raping women and even torturing children
would have ended Hamas’ political existence. Hezbollah's Shia base
afforded the group a leeway for political maneuvering, but there are
several other reasons behind its strategic posturing.
Firstly,
Hezbollah was initially established in the mid 80s in Southern Lebanon,
which was under Israeli occupation. The elements that founded Hezbollah
were the more religious types of the Shia populous in general, and from
the secular Amal Party in particular who were intrigued by the Iranian
revolution and the framework of thinking that gave rise to the idea of
the Wilayat al-Faqih of Imam Khomeini. Iranian Revolutionary Guard leaders established, trained and funded the new organization to become its arm in Lebanon under the guise of liberating Lebanon from Israel. It is this organic dependency that renders Hezbollah a mere tool within Iranian influence in the area,
and hence the direction of Iranian authorities for complete and
unquestioned support of their ally, Assad, whether this is in the
interest of Hezbollah or not.
Secondly,
aside from the physical support and funding that Iran provides as the
main benefactor for Hezbollah, the ideological influence is just as
intense, if not greater. Hassan Nasrallah, then leader-to-be, stated in
his speech, from old footage dated back to 1988, that "he would not be
in Hezbollah if its leadership wasn't practically and religiously
reporting to the chain of command of the Wilayat al-Faqih in Iran, since
otherwise it is considered a sin." This strong doctrinal
affiliation of Hezbollah also gives the religious authority in Iran a
complete leverage over its strategic decisions.
Third is
the Lebanese geography, which is surrounded by Syria from the north and
the east. The Mediterranean Sea is to its west and Israel, Hezbollah's
claimed foe, lies in the south. The Assad regime, since the time of
Hafez al-Assad, has adopted Hezbollah in an alliance and provided the
needed Iranian weapons to it through its long borders with Lebanon.
Syria has become the noose by which Hezbollah is controlled, since it is
its sole lifeline. Unlike Hamas, which is geographically far from Syria
and is more dependent on Egypt, Hezbollah is totally dependent on the Assad regime for its supplies.
Fourth is
the geopolitical situation worldwide from Hezbollah's perspective.
Hezbollah fears that if the rebels topple the Assad regime, a subsequent
Sunni government would cooperate with its neighbors against the Shia
expansionist project in the region, therefore it would discontinue
Hezbollah’s support and threaten its existence. What is more critical
to Hezbollah is the world powers’ united stance against a sweeping
victory for the rebels over Assad’s regime. Thus far the UN, US,
European as well as Russian position towards the Syrian revolution is a
negotiated political transition which will protect the current regime's
apparatus (security, military and business) and give the rebels seats in
a future government. The winner in this formula is without a doubt the
Assad regime and, by association, Hezbollah. Supporting Assad’s regime now acts as Hezbollah's insurance policy for the future.
Hezbollah's
strategic calculus is that the rebels will lose and be forced to sit
down with Assad, and that the real power will stay in the hands of the
current regime. This calculation, in addition to Iranian military and
religious influence, have structured Hezbollah’s relationship with
Assad. Hezbollah has put all of its eggs in one basket, the regime's,
and if the regime is gone, the very existence of Hezbollah will come
into question. Many in the rebels are now expressing sentiments of
exacting revenge upon Hezbollah post-Assad Syria, so it would have been
wiser to stay equidistant from both sides to mitigate these risks.
Hezbollah forgot that both currently and historically, the real stake
will always be with the masses, since no regime can withstand its own
people’s uprising.
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